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The institution of money is rapidly evolving thanks to developments in computerbased cryptography. Technological advances have made possible the creation of
cost-effective electronic alternatives to banknotes and coins, which are the
traditional physical currencies. This document aims to describe — based on
scientific literature — the use and characteristics of money, some of the problems
associated with issuing a new currency or a new payment instrument, and the
possible comparative advantages of a central bank in leading the way relative to
private issuers.

1 Introduction
Conducting retail transactions costs about 1% of GDP per year to the average European country
(Schmiedel et al. (2012), Segendorf and Jansson (2012)). 1 Half of this cost comes from commercial
banks, which have a prominent role in settling payments, especially now that the use of cash is
rapidly diminishing in some countries (Segendorf and Wretman 2015). 2 Moreover, a significant
portion of payments is typically executed by exchanging demand deposits, instruments that are
risky and therefore costly to insure.
Technological innovation has recently enabled alternatives to traditional currency instruments.
Thanks to new developments in cryptography and computing, it is now possible to develop digital
alternatives to traditional currencies that are as peer-to-peer as cash, as convenient as a debit card,
and potentially cheaper to use and safer than deposits. As a result, there is currently significant
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1
Defined as payments by cash, check debit and credit card, direct debit and credit transfer payments up to 50,000 Euros.

2
This decline is not common to all countries. For the US, Klee (2008) reports that cash captures 54% of all transactions
collected from scanner data at 99 grocery stores. Survey data from Austria and Canada shows that more than 50% of all
consumption purchases are paid for with cash (Huynh et al. (2013)).
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interest—both from private and public financial institutions—in understanding whether or not
there is scope for currency innovation.
Nowadays, the focus is on studying technologies that support the construction of cheap, safe and
reliable public ledgers, essentially decentralized record-keeping systems that can be adopted to
support the settlement of payments within large groups of traders who do not necessarily trust
one another. Broadly speaking, such record-keeping systems can theoretically allow traders to
accurately and quickly establish property rights over the instruments being traded, while, at the
same time, eliminating or at least minimizing the traditional layer of services provided by trusted
intermediaries, such as banks, in settling payments (Ali et al. (2014b), Barrdear and Kumhof
(2016)).
A prominent candidate technology is “blockchain technology” or “distributed ledger” (Nakamoto
(2008)), which was originally developed to support the Bitcoin network. This technology has
spurred a number of private currency-like instruments, and is currently being tested for settlement
of financial transactions (Bloomberg (2016a), The Economist (2015)). Importantly, this
technological innovation is being studied for possible application in the emission of “all-digital”
cash substitutes by central banks (Brainard (2016), Broadbent (2016), Fan (2016), Skingsley (2016)).
Throughout this document, I will call this type of instrument e-cash because, on the one hand, it is
as peer-to-peer as physical cash, and, on the other hand, it has a digital representation and is
electronically exchanged and stored, in much the same way as the main forms of digital money in
use today (commercial bank money and bank reserves at the central bank).
The possible economic consequences of bringing to the market an electronic substitute for cash
have not been systematically studied. Many questions are still open. Even so, the scientific
literature has addressed some of the fundamental, and closely related, questions. For example,
what is the role of a currency in society, and what supports its stability and value in the long-run?
Should we move away from traditional currency systems to embrace new technologies? What
problems or market failures can we foresee that are associated with introducing an alternative
payment instrument? Should central banks play an active role or should private issuers lead the
way? This document aims to describe—based on scientific literature—uses and characteristics of
money, some of the problems associated with issuing a new currency or a new payment
instrument, and the possible comparative advantages of a central bank in leading the way relative
to private issuers.
To summarize, moving away from traditional physical cash and into e-cash offers several potential
benefits. An improved currency system could be constructed that greatly reduces the costly layers
of the financial institutions that we currently use to process and settle electronic payments. E-cash
may also allow significant changes in the way in which currency is managed, as it is now technically
feasible to allow households direct access to the central bank balance sheet as Tobin suggested
(Tobin (1985)). This could revolutionize the way in which monetary policy is conducted, affecting
the monetary transmission channels, and the speed and efficacy of intervention. However, there
are also risks in moving away from traditional currency systems, which depend on how a new
currency system would be designed and operated. Granting deposits at the central bank could have
profound consequences for banks, their financing, and their asset-transformation role, which could
possibly adversely impact financial volatility during a crisis or during the transition period.
Understanding these issues should be one of the priorities of a central bank.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops some basic knowledge about money and the
role it serves in a society. Section 3 offers a simple characterization of the main monetary
instruments used nowadays. Section 4 discusses the problems and implications for central banks
associated with the introduction of electronic alternatives to cash. Section 5 touches upon
considerations about privacy and crime-related externalities, and Section 6 offers some final
comments.
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2 Currency, Money, and Cash
Currency identifies an object that widely circulates to facilitate payments. The term is commonly
used as a synonym for money. Although economic textbooks do not typically tell us what money
is — academics are still debating a possible answer 3 — there is consensus in the scientific literature
about what money does. According to a view going back at least to Aristotle, money serves three
basic functions. It facilitates trade by acting as a means of payment — e.g. we hand over banknotes
for a coffee. It serves quantification purposes as a unit of account (or standard of value) — e.g. we
choose our diet by comparing foods’ prices. It is also a store of value — e.g. we hold a checking
account balance to enable a future transaction or the repayment of financial and tax obligations.
To perform these functions, societies have typically chosen currency instruments that are durable,
highly portable, divisible, easy to authenticate and difficult to reproduce. Coins and banknotes —
commonly referred to as cash — are tangible monetary instruments and the ones that the public
is most familiar with.
The cash in use today is a sovereign fiat money, meaning that these tangible monetary instruments
are issued by a state authority but neither have intrinsic value — coins are not made of precious
metals, for example — nor are explicitly convertible into real assets such as precious metals (ECB
(2015b), McLehay et al. (2014)). However, cash has generally a special status: in most countries it
is “legal tender,” meaning that tendering banknotes and coins legally discharges financial
obligations. 4
But money is much more than cash. In particular, it includes two kinds of intangible monetary
instruments: banks’ reserves with the central bank (sovereign money), and commercial bank
deposits (instruments that are privately issued by commercial banks). The main difference
between these two kinds of money, sovereign and private, is on whom they are a claim. Sovereign
money is a claim on the central bank, and is often called “outside money” or “central bank money”;
commercial bank money is a claim on private domestic debt and is often called “inside money.” 5

2.1 The nature of money
To understand the role and the value of currency and monetary systems, we must answer two
questions. Why do societies use money? Which economic problems does money ultimately solve?
Money is first and foremost a social convention, which emerges to build trust among strangers in
their economic transactions, both intertemporal and in spot markets. A convention of monetary
exchange facilitates valuable intertemporal exchanges that would not occur otherwise.
According to this view, individuals who may neither know nor trust each other choose to settle
their transactions by offering symbolic objects—bank deposits or banknotes for instance—in
exchange for labor, goods and services because they find this trading arrangement superior to the
available alternatives (Camera, Casari and Bigoni (2013)). Hence, symbolic objects spontaneously
become money when individuals share the belief that those objects can be quickly and easily
exchanged for labor, goods and services in the foreseeable future. If no-one can personally gain
from acting differently—demanding payment of a different kind, for instance—then those

3

Krugman (2010) writes: “But here’s an even more basic question: what is money, anyway? It’s not a new question, but I
think it has become even more pressing in recent years.”
4
Legal tender is roughly interpreted as obliging the economic agents to accept the instrument as payment, but this
interpretation is not always fitting. For example, in the U.S. “legal tender discharges all debts for which the payment of
money is specified when tendered in the appropriate amount and in the proper manner” (Konvisser (1997)). In Sweden
everyone is obliged to accept banknotes and coins as payment, but only if the contracting parties have not made a different
agreement (Segendorf and Wilbe (2014)).
5
This distinction was made by John Gurley and Edward Shaw in their book “Money in a Theory of Finance.” Various
measures of the money supply — typically, monetary base, M1 and M2 — account for the different components of the
stocks of outside and inside money.
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symbolic objects become money and support a currency system. The system is stable if everyone
maintains their confidence in it. 6
A monetary trading pattern resembles an intertemporal gift-giving scheme, where each gift is
acknowledged by delivering a token. But, if tokens are intrinsically worthless, then why are they
exchanged at all? The answer is that doing so resolves an underlying trust problem. Any transaction
characterized by a mismatch between the timing of delivery of goods and of payment requires that
counterparts trust each other. However, the most valuable trades involve specialized goods. This
typically requires dealing with strangers, instead of trusted neighbors (Greif (2006)), which
prevents reciprocity and makes contractual enforcement problematic (Milgrom et al. (1990)).
Monetary exchange can overcome these contractual difficulties as long as traders are confident
that others will accept money in the future. Public confidence in the currency is thus key ingredient
in a monetary system.
This problem is conceptually represented in Figure 1. Assume there are many individuals in the
background who alternate between being producers and consumers of a non-storable good. They
meet each other at random in each period. The figure shown represents one such meeting. The
consumer benefits from receiving a gift of a good from the producer. Maximum welfare can only
be attained if individuals coordinate on a norm of mutual support, wherein every person makes a
gift of a good when they are a producer. However, people cannot guarantee they will reciprocate
a gift in the future because meetings are random. Markets, that is, are incomplete. This norm of
mutual support thus requires trusting that a gift made today corresponds to a gift in the future.
However, building this kind of trust is practically feasible only in small groups, where individuals
know each other very well.
Introducing a stable supply of symbolic tokens can resolve this market failure if people trust that
others will sell only in return for a token. In this case, the token becomes a currency. Public
confidence in the monetary system is thus inextricably linked to confidence in the currency issuer—
which is why central banks’ conduct is key for the stability of a currency system. A monetary system
can thus be viewed as a social convention that emerges to build the trust needed to support
valuable economic interactions among strangers. In a way, confidence in the institution of money
can shore up the lack of trust in other members of society. Laboratory research provides some
empirical support for this view (Camera and Casari (2014)).

6

In the language of economics, money emerges as the solution to a non-cooperative game — a Nash equilibrium. Shapley
and Shubik (1977), among the first to apply non-cooperative game theory to the study of money, put it as follows: “Although
a person may view, say, fiat money as being of dubious value as a store of wealth, he knows that most others will continue
to use it for trade, and he may be in no position to do otherwise himself.”
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Figure 1. How monetary exchange resolves trust problems
Each cell reports the outcome from a combination of actions (producer on the right, consumer on the left, and payoffs
listed below the human figures). The shaded cells refer to outcomes without a monetary system. The other cells depict the
additional outcomes possible when a monetary system is in place. The figure is an adaptation from Camera, Casari and
Bigoni (2013).
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Do informationally sophisticated societies need money?
Some economists have compared money to an information technology—a record-keeping device
(Ostroy (1973), Ostroy and Starr (1974), Townsend (1987)). Kocherlakota (1998) suggested that
money is a rudimentary public monitoring system. According to this view, if it is difficult to write
and enforce contracts, then revealing others’ past conduct is sufficient to deter opportunistic
behavior in a community. According to Kocherlakota (1998), all that is needed to ensure that
counterparts keep their promises is the possibility to publicly reveal departures from agreed-upon
plans, because this information can be used to trigger punishment by the entire community (Abreu
et al. (1990), Kandori (1992)). Thus, the theory says, monetary exchange has a role to play only if
monitoring past conduct is difficult. This is the sense in which money is simply a substitute for
public monitoring systems. According to this view, currency systems should have no role to play in
informationally sophisticated societies (Kahn et al., (2005), Corbae et al. (2007)). Laboratory
evidence does not support this assertion. Individuals who can see others' past conduct do not, in
fact, frequently cooperate (Bigoni et al. (2015)). This suggests that money is likely to remain a
valuable institution even as societies become more interconnected and informationally
sophisticated.

2.2 A monetary system is a public good
The discussion above suggests that currencies and monetary systems are a public good, much as
clean air, national defense, or national parks. In its most basic form, a monetary system is nonexcludable — single individuals can hardly be prevented from using banknotes and coins. 7 It is also
non-rival because an individual’s participation in the system does not impede another’s use. In
fact, it likely raises the value of the currency through network effects — a currency that is widely
used is more valuable than one that is not, because it enables more trades. As is typical in public
goods problems, self-interested individuals would rationally choose to free-ride by avoiding to
privately contribute to this public good, reducing their input to building and maintaining
“confidence in the currency.” This socially inefficient provision would take the form of an excessive
emission of currency instruments under a laissez-faire approach, which would reduce confidence
in the currency, lowering the value of the currency up to the point where the monetary system
would collapse because the future value of the currency would be too small (Ritter (1995)). 8 This
public goods aspect of monetary systems is one of the factors justifying the central role of public
institutions in the provision of currency instruments (Tobin (1985)) and, consequently, in playing
an active role in currency innovation.

3 Modern monetary instruments: physical vs. digital
There are many ways to classify the monetary instruments in use today. 9 Table 1 adopts a
conceptual classification based on two basic features: the denomination of the currency
instrument — either a sovereign reference unit or not — and its type — physical or not. This is
convenient because, on the one hand, modern currencies are typically sovereign but only in (small)
part physical; on the other hand, the key technological innovation has been originally confined to
instruments, such as Bitcoin, which are purely digital and are not denominated in sovereign
reference units.

7
In fact, this is true for domestic as well as foreign users. The U.S. dollar supports trade in many countries and U.S.
authorities cannot effectively prevent this from happening.
8
This is exactly what happened with Stockholms Banco, the first bank in Sweden. The bank was established in 1656 but
folded in 1664 after the general public lost confidence in the banknotes it issued. The bank was then rescued by the Swedish
parliament in 1668, and became the Riksbank. See http://www.riksbank.se/en/The-Riksbank/History/.
9
For example, the BIS identifies physical tokens, privately issued notes, cash, central bank deposits, commercial bank
money, legally recognized e-money and digital currencies as being distinct types of assets (Bank for International
Settlements (2015), Figure 1). Some are issued by a central bank, some are not. Some are centrally issued and some are
not. Some are physical some are not.
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Table 1. A basic classification of modern types of monetary instruments

Type: Physical

Denomination:
Sovereign reference unit

Notes and tokens
(central bank coins &
banknotes)

Type: Digital
E-money
(central bank reserves,
commercial bank
money)
E-cash
(RSCoin concept)

Denomination:
Other reference unit

Notes and tokens
(Ithaca HOURS) 10

Abstract currencies
(Bitcoin, Ethereum)

The currencies in existence today are typically issued by a sovereign institution, such as a central
bank or a national mint. This is especially true for physical currencies, coins and banknotes. But
cash, which is synonymous for physical currency, is not the predominant form of money: for
example, U.S. banknotes and coins comprise slightly more than 2/5 of M1, the smaller of the two
money stock measures published by the Board of Governors and currently the narrowest monetary
aggregate. 11 There is no consensus on the language used to describe the money component that
lacks the physical structure of cash. I will use the term digital currency, to emphasize that the
instrument is intangible, and is based on computer technology.
A characteristic of digital currencies is that — unlike banknotes and coins, settlement cannot be
completed by a simple physical transfer of the instrument. A ledger — i.e. a record-keeping system
— must be in place to establish property rights over the instrument. 12 As a result, users of digital
currencies must rely on some trusted institution — an intermediary, a network of banks, or a group
of fellow system participants — to help with the processing of transactions and the ledger
updating. This is where innovation in cryptography and computing has recently made a big
contribution, as I next explain.

Ithaca HOURS is a privately issued fiat currency that has circulated in the city of Ithaca, New York, since 1991 when a
local resident issued the first notes. It is accepted by local businesses and residents. One hour is worth $10 and its supply is
currently valued at about $100,000; see http://www.paulglover.org/hours.html.
11
It includes cash held by the public and transaction deposits at depository institutions. The figure is not that different if
we consider the sum of the Federal Reserve’s monetary liabilities and the Treasury’s monetary liabilities (the monetary
base or “high-power money”), where the share of cash is slightly less than 40%. In the U.S., M1 is currently the narrowest
monetary aggregate, about 10% smaller than the monetary base.
12
Roughly speaking, a ledger is needed when physical possession and transfer of an instrument is impossible or insufficient
to establish property rights over the instrument.
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3.1 Sovereign digital money: e-money
Most digital currencies are denominated in a sovereign unit, and issued by central banks as well as
private institutions — such as commercial banks. I will define electronic money, or e-money for
short, as an electronic representation of a physical sovereign currency. 13 As such, e-money has
been around for a long time. The main forms of e-money are commercial bank reserves with the
central bank and the money created by commercial banks when they make loans. E-money can
generate revenue for the issuer, which roughly corresponds to the spread between the yields on
securities bought and liabilities issued; 14 the owner of e-money has a claim on the issuer’s funds,
while e-money represents a liability for the issuer.
Though e-money does not necessarily imply a legal right to a physical currency, it has so far typically
implied, or is taken to imply, that owners of e-money can exchange the instrument at par for the
underlying physical currency without restriction (e.g. demand deposits). This characteristic is
behaviorally important because it may boost confidence in the currency system in periods of
uncertainty, since individuals can disintermediate their savings and independently store value by
physically hoarding the instrument. 15
Broadly speaking, every financial institution participates in partly maintaining the ledger associated
with an e-money system. This ledger is not public. Settlement relies on several layers of trusted
institutions (banks, courts, central banks, etc.) and is ultimately accomplished by adjusting the
reserves of commercial banks with the central bank (Broadbent (2016)). In this sense, the system
is centralized and likely more expensive compared to systems that grant some decentralization.
Blockchain technology—which essentially is a kind of database that can be easily shared—has
made possible the creation of secure bookkeeping systems called distributed (or public) ledgers
that can be publicly shared. According to some observers, this database-sharing innovation has the
potential to raise the speed of settlement while dramatically lowering settlement costs compared
to traditional payments systems (UK Government Office for Science, (2016)). 16 I discuss this next.

3.2 Non-sovereign digital money: abstract currencies
The past ten years have seen the creation of a new class of digital instruments that are not issued
by a sovereign institution or commercial bank, are not denominated in a sovereign unit, and do
not have physical counterparts. Since these instruments may be used as a currency (though not
everyone agrees, e.g., Krugman 2013, Rogoff (2014)), they are variously labeled “electronic cash,”
“digital currency,” “virtual currency,” “altcoins,” or “cryptocurrencies.” 17 What are these digital
instruments, why have they been created, and how do they differ from e-money?

13
The CPMI’s “A glossary of terms used in payments and settlement systems” defines e-money as “value stored
electronically in a device such as a chip card or a hard drive in a personal computer” (Bank for International Settlements
(2015)). The European Commission has a similar definition: “Electronic money is a digital equivalent of cash, stored on an
electronic device or remotely at a server.” (see http://ec.europa.eu/finance/payments/emoney/index_en.htm)
14
In the case of central bank money, this is called seigniorage. It roughly corresponds to the interest income earned from
the assets on its balance sheet (Haslag (1998)). A way to empirically calculate it is to take the product between the yield on
an appropriately chosen portfolio of securities (typically, government bonds) and base money deflated by the CPI. As the
choice of portfolio is somewhat arbitrary, empirical work often measures seigniorage as the change in monetary base
normalized by CPI or GDP (Klein and Neumann (1990)).
15
Ecuador’s recently inaugurated Sistema de Dinero Electrónico is based on a mobile-phone electronic wallet denominated
in US dollars. The Bank of Ecuador manages the system and backs it by holding 100% physical reserves of U.S. liquid assets
(Ecuador Embassy in the US).
16
This cost-saving aspect is non-trivial. A recent study estimates that half of the social costs of retail payments —
amounting to about 0.5% of GDP in the average European country — are incurred by banks (Schiedel at al., (2012)). Indeed,
currently payments are settled by exchanging commercial banks’ reserves, since these are the players who have sole access
to the central bank’s balance sheet.
17
The architect of Bitcoin called it “electronic cash” (Nakamoto (2008)). The European Banking Authority (2014) and
European Central Bank (2015a) call the instruments based on blockchain technology “virtual currencies”. Some prefer
“digital currency” (Broadbent (2016), Ali et al. (2014), Bank for International Settlements (2015)). Others use the words
“cryptocurrencies” or “altcoins” (Bitcoin Magazine (2016), Danezis and Meiklejohn (2016)).
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The central innovation compared to traditional currencies and traditional digital payment
instruments is most of them are based on a distributed ledger in order to avoid reliance on the
traditional layers of formal institutions — such central banks, banking authorities, and commercial
banks — to process transactions and update ledgers. I will collectively call this category of new
currency instruments abstract currencies. 18 They are currencies in the sense that they can be
exchanged peer-to-peer, much as cash. They are abstract in the sense that they neither exist in
space nor refer to an existing instrument, physical or financial (for example, deposits). Simply put,
they are representations of numbers, i.e., abstract objects.
An abstract currency system is a self-enforcing system of property rights over an abstract
instrument, which gives its owners the freedom to use and the right to exclude others from using
the instrument. Using the instrument solely consists of digitally hoarding it or transferring
ownership to other system participants, according to the system’s built-in rules.
Bitcoin
Bitcoin is the first abstract currency system ever created. It appeared on the 3rd of January 2009,
when the open source computer code was made public and the first ten bitcoins were created. The
system allows the transfer of property rights over abstract objects called “bitcoins” among network
participants. The system is built around the blockchain-based distributed ledger framework
discussed in Nakamoto (2008). The emission of bitcoins is regulated by a mathematical algorithm
that ensures a bounded, predictable bitcoin supply.
Unlike a traditional currency, an abstract currency is not issued by a central authority, is not a claim
on any issuer, and is not backed by any central authority (through legal tender status, for example).
Being a fiat instrument, an abstract currency acquires value only if its users are confident that the
instrument is a safe store of value and its ownership can be easily transferred to someone else in
the foreseeable future, in exchange for labor, goods, services, or other stores of value (e.g. other
currencies or financial instruments). Since the instrument cannot be physically possessed, this
means that property rights over the instrument must be established through some ledger system.
The crucial innovation lies in how property rights are established and managed compared to
traditional e-money systems.
Nowadays, the exchange of e-money relies on designated trusted intermediaries—such as banks
and central banks — to update electronic ledgers. Intuitively, this resolves a problem of trust. If
counterparts have little or no trust in each other, then trade requires an intermediary that can be
trusted not to falsify the ledger’s records. In traditional currency systems, only specially designated
intermediaries can access the ledger. Instead, the original idea behind an abstract currency system
(Nakamoto (2008)) is to enable electronic payments without having to rely on designated
intermediaries. The solution to this problem partly relies on making the history of all transactions
completely public through the “blockchain database,” also known as the “distributed ledger”
(“distributed timestamp” in Nakamoto (2008)).
How the distributed ledger supports trade
Property rights over an instrument are established by making the history of all transactions public
through the blockchain database. One can think of this public ledger as a system-wide database
that is transparent and synchronized: every system participant locally stores the entire history of
payments. A payment thus simply corresponds to a time-stamped change in record in the public
ledger, which takes the form of an addition to the blockchain database. In a way, the blockchain
records the ownership trajectory of each instrument over time, as if describing a long chain of
events. A transaction is verified as having taken place if there is sufficient consensus among system
participants that a proposed change in instrument’s ownership does not conflict with the
18

The term “abstract” uniquely differentiates these instruments from unrelated instruments. For example, stored-value
cards are a form of currency that relies on cryptographic technology; commercial bank reserves represent currency in digital
form. In the computer-based (i.e., virtual) reality called “Second Life” trades must be completed with Linden dollars; this
“virtual currency” thus ends up being traded for US dollars. This is unlike Bitcoin, whose value is not tied to a virtual reality.
9 [23]

information stored in the database (“Nakamoto consensus”). All valid payments are peer-to-peer
— as if exchanging physical cash — and are irreversible.
To build consensus, some system participants must be willing to verify the validity of transactions
— impartially and honestly — using computational methods that are made costly and lengthy on
purpose. Those who choose to verify transactions are called ‘miners’ because they are
compensated with newly created currency. Money creation is tied to settlement. Miners act as
private third parties that compete among themselves to provide settlement services but, unlike
banks, are unsupervised, unregulated, and face no counterparty risk. Computational burdens,
database transparency and competition to verify prevent fraud in the form of double-spending. 19
Abstract currency payments are not intermediated — although they take place over the internet,
they are peer-to-peer like cash — they are settled as soon as enough system participants agree
they are valid. A proposed change in the instrument’s ownership is valid when there is enough
consensus that the change does not conflict with the information contained in the public record. 20
At that point, the transaction is made irreversible and is added to the public record in real time.
Roughly speaking, the incentive to commit fraud — which simply means altering records to spend
someone else’s asset (“double spending”) — is removed in two ways. First, validation work is
randomly rewarded with a newly created instrument — thus promoting consensus-building
through competition on validation. Second, the validation process is constrained to be
computationally challenging — thus preventing record falsification by minority coalitions.
An advantage of an abstract currency is that transactions are peer-to-peer, thus avoiding the
counterparty risk to which intermediaries are exposed in settling traditional payments. At the same
time, an abstract currency grants the convenience of digital transactions with fast settlement 21 at
a lower cost compared to the digital money currently in use in most countries. For example, the
Automated Clearing House network used by U.S. depository institutions to make electronic
transfers works through batch processing of transactions, and it only recently started to allow same
day settlement (NACHA, (2016)). 22 However, it must be noted that this characteristic is not unique
to blockchain-based payments. Some countries already operate real-time settlement systems that
are very fast and the speed-cost advantages of blockchain technology are less clear. For example,
Sweden’s cell phone-based “Swish” peer-to-peer payments service is supported by a real-time
settlement system called BiR; that system could be possibly used for other payments services
(Segendorf and Wretman (2015)).
There are also drawbacks in abstract currency systems like Bitcoin: (i) they can only generate a rigid
currency supply, which is bounded above in the long-run, 23 (ii) they may not be easily “scalable”
in the sense that they can only handle low transaction volumes (7 transactions per second for
Bitcoin, vs several thousand for Visa, for example), (iii) they are highly volatile instruments, partly
19

This does not mean that governance must necessarily be distributed. Bitcoin was intentionally designed so that a
currency system could be operated without designing intermediaries that should be entrusted with record-keeping. If the
incentives to perform validating services are adequate, then proper validation is self-enforcing and trust in the currency
system is self-generating. However, problems with incentives for proper validation have recently emerged (Danezis and
Meiklejohn (2015)). It is thus an open question whether or not introducing trusted record-keeping institutions could
improve system governance—even, in this case, whether the structure of the intermediary’s incentives matters.
20
A straight majority of system participants must recognize the transaction as valid. An accessible technical description
of the distributed ledger technology can be found in the UK Government Office for Science (2016), Ali et al. (2014a), or
Boehme et al. (2015).
21
Bitcoin is neither particularly fast nor easily scalable. Transactions take several minutes to be confirmed and the system,
in its current form, is unlikely to scale beyond 100 transactions per second (Decker and Wattenhofer (2015)). Moreover,
Bitcoin transactions are typically considered final only after six confirmations, which creates a delay of about an hour before
the transaction is validated (Boehme et al. (2015))
22
The U.S. ACH system is a nationwide network through which depository institutions send each other batches of
electronic credit and debit transfers (Board of Governors, (2016)). The Federal Reserve Banks and Electronic Payments
Network are the two national ACH operators.
23
The rule regulating the emission of bitcoins is built into the system and cannot be altered without reaching consensus
among system participants. Roughly speaking, instruments are emitted every time a transaction is validated. The emission
rate is designed to decline over time until all emission stops, at which point the supply of instruments can no longer
increase.
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because their value is not tied to a sovereign currency, and (iv) they tend to suffer from incentive
problems as the network size increases. These practical considerations — as well as public
confidence, coordination and stability challenges due to the lack of a central authority — partly
motivate recent studies about the conceptual feasibility of sovereign digital currencies based on
decentralized ledgers, as discussed below.

3.3 E-cash proposals between abstract currency and e-money
There is currently significant interest from academics and practitioners in the conceptual feasibility
of sovereign digital currencies that could be issued by a central authority but that would exploit
the flexibility of blockchain technology (Ali et al. (2014b), Barrdear and Kumhof (2016), Bank for
International Settlements (2015), Danezis and Meiklejohn (2015)). We are starting to see some
proof-of-concept currencies. One example is the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) studied by
the Bank of England (discussed below).
As in the case of banknotes and coins, the exchange of this new kind of currency from payer to
payee would imply immediate settlement of the transaction. Unlike traditional currencies, and like
abstract currencies, transactions would be broadcast to all system participants and would be
validated through some consensus protocol. As a result, settlement would not require the
exchange of bank reserves at the central bank.
Since these instruments are envisioned as a purely digital version of a coin or a banknote, I will use
the terminology electronic cash, or e-cash for short, to differentiate them from both e-money and
abstract currencies.
No e-cash system is yet in place, though some institutions are studying it. Examples include the
Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) studied by the Bank of England (Broadbent (2016), Barrdear
and Kumhof (2016)) and the proof of concept known as RSCoin (Danezis and Meiklejohn (2016)).
The RSCoin concept
The study in Danezis and Meiklejohn (2016) proposes an e-cash instrument, called RSCoin, to be
issued by a trusted central institution (a central bank, for example). Unlike traditional e-monies,
the transaction ledger would not be centrally maintained by the issuing institution. Instead, it
would be partially distributed using blockchain technology. This, according to the authors, could
allow high rates of transactions at low cost. To support the system, designated authorities called
“mintettes” — basically, pre-existing intermediaries such as commercial banks — would be
authorized to collect transactions and would ultimately be collectively responsible for producing a
consistent, cross-referenced ledger. This ledger would then be sent back to the central institution
for final validation. It is unclear if RSCoin would be exchangeable upon demand for physical
sovereign currency.
The Bank of Canada is also studying a sovereign currency called CAD-COIN, which would adopt a
distributed ledger based on blockchain technology. This instrument is being studied as a way to
facilitate wholesale interbank payments, not for use by the general public, and its supply would be
tied one-to-one to the amount of cash collateral pledged by system participants, and fully
convertible into physical currency (Forbes (2016)). Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi is also studying a
distributed ledger private currency fully backed by yen, as well as denominated in and convertible
into yen (Reuters (2016)).
Recently, several central bankers have started to openly discuss the possibility and consequences
of introducing an e-cash alternative to traditional physical currency. The Bank of England’s deputy
governor for monetary policy has noted that it is now conceptually and technically possible for a
central bank to directly issue a new electronic currency in a manner that widens access to its
balance sheet beyond commercial banks, not only to non-bank financial companies but even to
individuals (Broadbent, (2016)). A deputy governor at the People’s Bank of China wrote that central
banks should take the lead in developing “digital legal tender of their own” (Fan (2016)). A Federal
Reserve Board of Governors member remarked that the distributed ledger technology “may
11 [23]

represent the most significant development in many years in payments, clearing, and settlement”
(Brainard (2016)). In Sweden, the Riksbank is studying whether or not to meet the general public’s
need for central bank money by supplying it in some electronic form (Skingsley (2016)).

4 Electronic alternatives to cash: challenges and
implications for central banks
Private issuers have readily exploited blockchain technology to offer electronic currencies of their
own (collectively called “altcoins”) such as Ethereum, and Litecoin, 24 partly to address some of the
shortcomings identified with Bitcoin (Danezis and Meiklejohn (2016)). Given this, is there scope for
a central bank to take a leading role in developing and issuing e-cash? This section helps form an
answer by focusing on three classes of problem associated with issuing a new currency
instrument—public confidence in the currency, avoiding coordination failures, and ensuring
financial system stability—three problems that may give rise to market failures and create scope
for a central bank-issued currency beyond the obvious benefit of obtaining seigniorage revenue.

4.1 Confidence
A currency system is self-sustaining when the public has trust in the feasibility of the underlying
trading arrangement. In practice, this means that system participants must have confidence in the
currency’s future value and acceptability. Ultimately, this requires confidence in the issuer, so an
essential characteristic of any currency is on whom it is a claim. Do private and public issuers have
differential advantages in supporting confidence in a currency instrument?
Historically, public confidence in a currency largely referred to the quality of the coins that formed
the basis of the currency. States had an obvious advantage in guaranteeing this quality over private
issuers, not only because they could set and enforce quality standards more easily than private
issuers, but also because states can internalize the long-run benefits of a stable currency, thus
strengthening the incentive to avoid debasements (Goodhart (1998)).
Unredeemable currencies exhibit a similar confidence problem. In a fiat monetary system, the
currency’s value is a projection of its expected future acceptability and trading value. Confidence
in a currency thus largely depends on expectations about the issuer’s future actions. And here lies
the central problem. Issuing currency generates a benefit for an issuer, through the interest income
earned from the assets it acquires (seigniorage). There is thus a temptation to behave
opportunistically and overissue currency. Confidence in a currency exists when the public believes
that the issuer will not emit currency beyond the point where the currency’s value will become
unstable or rapidly decline. Lack of confidence in the issuer is a serious threat to a fiat currency. It
can lead people to believe that the currency might no longer be accepted on some future date. If
so, then we would witness a hyperinflationary spiral (Faust (1989)) or, at worst, the currency’s
value would immediately collapse (Cass and Shell (1980)).
Although current thinking in monetary theory pays little attention to the role of governments in
establishing a currency, 25 some studies have emphasized that a credible public issuer might have
a confidence advantage over private issuers.
First, currency systems are public goods and private issuers may not give sufficient weight to the
externalities generated by money creation and so may end up oversupplying it. By contrast,
governments can more easily internalize these externalities, and thus better mitigate the risk of a
currency oversupply. If so, a sovereign currency system is less likely to suffer from confidence
24

See https://coinmarketcap.com/ for a snapshot of current market capitalization of these altcoins. At the time of writing,
more than 600 altcoins are being traded and the total market capitalization is $11.4 billion, 80% of which is associated with
Bitcoin.
25
Goodhart (2009) notes: “economists have tended to ignore historical reality, to establish formal mathematical models
of how private agents (with no government), transacting among themselves, might jointly adopt an equilibrium in which
they all settle on a common monetary instrument.”
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problems than a privately issued currency (Ritter (1995)). A related issue is enforcement of the
quality of the currency. Governments typically control or operate the institutions that enforce the
rules governing a society. Hence, there can be advantages from vertical integration of the two tasks
of emitting currency and enforcing the currency emission rules. The design of Bitcoin reflects an
attempt to resolve this crucial enforcement problem without relying on central institutions. In
doing so, it creates other kinds of problems—for example, an inelastic currency supply and an
inability to control illicit financial flows. This speaks in favor of a sovereign e-cash system.
Second, public monitoring of conduct is known to help mitigate temptations to behave
opportunistically (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)). The public can more easily monitor the
actions taken by a central bank compared to those taken by a private issuer. This is likely to
enhance the stability and value of the currency, because it allows a quick and coordinated response
to socially undesirable policies, thus removing the incentives to stray from optimal policy in the
first place.
Third, short planning horizons weaken the incentive to keep promises compared to having a longrun horizon (Friedman (1971)). Hence, the planning horizon affects the incentive to manipulate the
currency supply. A currency issuer that is motivated by short-run objectives has stronger incentives
to manipulate the currency supply to extract short-run rents compared to an issuer pursuing longrun objectives. Central banks tend to have longer planning horizons compared to private issuers.
This allows central banks to internalize the social costs that monetary instability has in the long
run. This long-run perspective is reinforced for central banks that are independent of the political
authorities, as political authorities may be more easily tempted by the possibility of attaining shortterm gains. Having a long-run view seems especially important in periods of uncertainty, to
maintain confidence in the currency and avoid self-fulfilling currency collapses.
Self-fulfilling currency collapses
The value of a fiat currency is linked to expectations about its future acceptability as a means of
payment. If confidence in an existing currency rapidly deteriorates, or if there is no sufficient
confidence in a new currency, then the currency value will collapse to zero. To illustrate this, note
we accept a currency in exchange for goods and services only if we believe that the currency can
be easily spent. If we all think this way, then the currency is broadly accepted, thus confirming (or
fulfilling) the initial belief in the currency’s value. On the other hand, we will not accept a currency
if we doubt that others want it. If we all share this view, then the currency will not be broadly
accepted, thus confirming the initial belief. Here, the currency’s value collapses to zero. This
outcome is self-fulfilling because it is entirely driven by initial beliefs. Simply put, if the public
doubts that others will want a currency instrument, then that instrument’s value will quickly
collapse.
Finally, in many countries, sovereign currencies have a well-established history of use and
monetary authorities are trusted; this may prove to be an advantage for a national e-cash system
over privately issued alternatives. In countries with trusted and well-functioning monetary
institutions, a sovereign issuer could leverage the pre-existing trust to more easily build confidence
in a new currency instrument, compared to private issuers. 26
Overall, these considerations suggest that a sovereign issuer is in a unique position because it can
more easily internalize the externalities associated with introducing a new currency, and can more
easily build confidence in the instrument’s stability compared to private issuers. However,
additional research is needed on this topic. Empirical evidence would be especially valuable.

26 This does not mean, of course, that states are necessarily trustworthy currency providers. The hyperinflationary
experience in Zimbabwe in the first decade of this century, and the recent and sudden de-monetization in India come to
mind.
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4.2 Coordination problems
When more than one instrument exists that can serve the role of a currency, then the choice of
instrument to use may become a problem. The reason is that there could be miscoordination
resulting in partial adoption of multiple instruments instead of the common adoption of a single
one. This fragmentation of payment methods is a source of inefficiency because it complicates
settlement and raises its cost.
To understand this point, suppose two fiat currency instruments exist in fixed supply and only differ
in their color. Individuals independently select which one to adopt. Here, one of the two
instruments may be accepted by everyone, but it may also happen that none are wholly accepted
(Kiyotaki and Wright (1993)). This second scenario is inefficient because the instruments’
fragmented use may sometimes prevent trade from taking place. In this sense, money shares many
similarities with language (Polanyi, (1957)). Coordinating on a single language is beneficial because
the greater the number of people who speak a language, the more valuable it is to speak that
language. The same holds true for money. These are known as “network effects” or “strategic
complementarities,” meaning that individuals benefit from making identical choices (Cooper and
John (1988)).
Coordination problems as a two-person game
Eva and Isabella must independently choose one of two communication systems, A or B. Their joint
choices determine if a communication system will be set up, and how they will share a prize V from
setting it up:
Outcome

Payoff

AA

Eva earns 60 percent of V, and Isabella earns 40 percent

AB

No communication system is set up and no prize is won, so both earn 0

BA

No communication system is set up and no prize is won, so both earn 0

BB

Eva earns 40 percent of V, and Isabella earns 60 percent

Eva and Isabella want to coordinate on some common system to avoid a total failure. In the
language of economics there is a positive network externality. But there is also strategic
uncertainty because, though AA and BB are both equilibria, neither Eva nor Isabella is sure what
the other will do. In fact, their interests are conflicting because Eva prefers AA, but Isabella prefers
BB. If either AB or BA is realized, then we have a coordination failure. Having a third party acting as
a coordinator may help.
Numerous studies have found that miscoordination commonly occurs in simple coordination
games (van Huyck et al. (1990)) as well as in more complex tasks. For example, payment
arrangements may be inefficiently selected (Camera et al. (2016)) and it is difficult to coordinate
on a smooth transition from an “inferior” to a “superior” currency (Camera at al. (2003)). Habit can
play an important role in leading to an inefficient selection of payment methods (van der Horst and
Matthijsen (2013)).
These observations suggest there is scope for a public institution to serve as the sole issuer of the
currency. A sovereign issuer can help resolve coordination problems by granting legal tender status
to a newly issued instrument. A drawback of granting legal tender status to a new instrument is
that it effectively imposes a constraint on the choice of payment instrument, which may itself be
suboptimal. A government can also set a standard by requiring a new state-issued currency in
payment for taxes—something known as the tax-foundation theory of money (Starr (1974),
Goldberg (2012)).
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4.3 Stability
A major open question is whether introducing a digital alternative to a traditional currency can
induce instability in the monetary and financial system, and why this may happen. Here, I consider
four aspects of this problem that have been discussed but that should be more carefully studied. 27
4.3.1
Design of the instrument
Letting a central bank issue e-cash could induce instability by creating changes in the funding base
of banks and would thereby alter the relation between banks and the central bank — possibly
generating disintermediation in times of crisis. As an illustration, suppose that the central bank
issues e-cash in a manner that gives direct access to its balance sheet to households — not only
financial institutions. This could be as simple as a liquidity deposit, or could be more sophisticated.
For example, central bank e-cash could pay some interest, thus coming into direct competition
with the traditional role of commercial banks (Broadbent, (2016)). Either way, by design this
instrument would be quickly and cheaply transferable from and to intermediaries. This might
increase financial market volatility. In normal times, volatility could be induced by stochastic flows
of deposits in and out of e-cash. In periods of uncertainty, households might seek the safety of the
central bank, thus giving rise to rapid outflows of funds from commercial banks, as in a digital
version of the classic bank run. This kind of volatility in funding liquidity would naturally have
implications for the way banks fund their projects and for the cost of deposit insurance. On the
other hand, interest-bearing e-cash could improve the stabilization of the business cycle (Barrdear
and Kumhof (2016)).
The impact of interest-bearing e-cash is, for natural reasons, still an open question. Empirically,
there are reasons to be cautious. I am not aware of historical examples in which an interestcarrying currency has been at the heart of a stable currency system, widely circulating side-by-side,
or instead of, a non interest-bearing currency. 28 On the other hand, the technical opportunity to
issue such an instrument has not emerged until now. The uncertain consequences of an interestbearing currency may be purely behavioral: individuals might attempt to hoard it and speculate on
its value (Camera et al. (2003)). The public may also perceive different currency instruments as
being only partially fungible, leading to an inefficient use, for example using interest-paying e-cash
to store value but not as a currency, as per some form of “mental accounting” (Thaler (1999)). 29
These kinds of problems can presumably be minimized by letting the central bank offer individual
deposit accounts that are a modern version of Tobin’s deposited currency: a plain, non-interest
bearing cash-like instrument, 100% backed and payable on demand in cash (Tobin (1985)).
Blockchain technology indeed seems to offer a cost-effective means to emit and manage this type
of instrument.
4.3.2
Lack of explicit anchors
Letting private issuers provide e-cash may induce price instability, if price floors cannot be easily
established. The experience with abstract currencies suggests that it may indeed be difficult to find
price floors (a nominal anchor) with privately-issued electronic currencies. Bitcoin, for example, is
very volatile and, for this reason, has been criticized for being an unstable store of value and,
therefore, unsuitable as a currency (Krugman (2013)). Instability is a problem because it gets in the
way of widespread adoption. One can apply evolutionary arguments to formalize this point by
studying the stability of a fiat currency system when many individuals make independent adoption
decisions. The system will collapse if the initial currency value has too low a price floor, as this
negatively interferes with the dynamics of adoption and use (Camera et al. (2013)). Sovereign ecash would reduce these risks, by providing explicit anchors such as making the new instrument
legal tender, accepting it to discharge tax obligations, or accepting it in exchange for government
27
28

Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) discusses a wider variety of stability issues.

Arkansas offers one historical example where, for a couple of years during the Civil War, small denomination bonds
circulated. But that happened only after they became receivable for taxes at par (Burdekin and Weidenmier (2008)).
29
According to this theory, different types of economic activities are uniquely assigned to special accounts, each with its
own budget constraint. As a result, a dollar destined to be spent on a vacation is not perceived as being the same as a dollar
to be spent on groceries.
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debt. Central bank e-cash issued against government debt could also support financial stability
(Barrdear and Kumhof (2016)).
4.3.3
The transition to a cashless society
Phasing out cash, to make space for e-cash, is another potential source of instability. Convertibility
upon demand into banknotes or coins, or some other tangible store of value is important for
traditional e-money, and it should remain an important element of competition between
traditional and alternative currencies, especially in periods of financial instability. Cash is
considered a “safe haven” in periods of crisis or negative interest rates. For example, some
institutional investors are currently implementing physical cash-hoarding strategies and
respectable fund managers are advocating storing physical currency to better diversity portfolios
(Bloomberg (2016b), The Telegraph (2015)). However, if e-cash and cash coexist, then the tradeoff
between e-cash and cash may create significant swings in currency flows in and out of depository
institutions in periods of crisis. This concern may suggest a reason to gradually phase out physical
currency, once an electronic alternative is made available. Another advantage of doing central
banking without circulating coins and banknotes is that the liquidity would never leave the system.
Depending on how the system is constructed, this might decrease vulnerability to bank runs. For
example, Broadbent (2016) notes that, if the central bank engaged in deposit taking, then it might
make deposits safer because “the central bank can’t run out of cash and therefore can’t suffer a
‘run’.” This would also affect other costs, as it would impact the way in which banks finance their
lending activities. This is something that should be carefully studied.
Phasing out physical cash could also effectively remove the zero lower bound on interest rates —
so central bank e-cash could easily support negative interest rates. 30 This is because current
monetary models assume zero nominal interest rates as the lower bound of monetary policy.
Below zero, there is an arbitrage opportunity available (Hicks (1935) and (1937)), as borrowing to
buy cash is profitable and it is preferable to convert deposits into cash. Issuing e-cash while
abolishing physical cash could thus — according to some observers — expand the set of monetary
policy options. If policy is ineffective at the zero lower bound, then this could be an advantage in
periods of crisis, as it would simplify the implementation of monetary policy. A caveat is that it is
unclear whether the zero lower bound reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy (Swanson and
Williams (2014)). Moreover, there already exists an array of non-standard policy instruments that
offer opportunities for central banks to overcome zero lower bound constraints (Cœuré (2015)).
Naturally, we do not yet know the consequences of charging rates below a negative value that
accounts for the costs of storing and shipping cash for a prolonged period of time. Although some
have noted this may create instability (Bech and Malkhozov (2016)), 31 this remains an important
research question.
4.3.4
System security
Physical cash is subject to the problem of counterfeiting, but e-cash is unlikely to be immune from
security problems either. An e-cash system would take the form of a network operating through
internet connections. Governments have been known to purposefully shut down internet traffic
on a regional or local scale to achieve political objectives. 32 Large scale internet disruptions can
also occur that are entirely accidental, as happened in Algeria in 2015 when an undersea cable was
cut, or could be intentional. Another problem is the possibility of distributed-denial-of-service
attacks that shut down specific internet sites. Attacks of this type are becoming increasingly
sophisticated and common against governments and private companies alike (NYT (2016)), which
is a concern because blockchain-based instruments such as Bitcoin are typically managed and
30

According to the deputy governor of the Bank of England: “[...] were a CBDC fully to displace paper currency, that would
open the door to the possibility of materially negative interest rates […] But that would require explicitly abolishing cash,
not just introducing an electronic alternative.” (Broadbent (2016)).
31 The demand for cash has so far remained stable in those countries with negative interest rates; Bech and Malkhozov
(2016) note that “the fact that retail bank customers have so far been shielded from negative rates has probably played a
key role in keeping the demand for cash stable.”
32
Recently, Bahrain shut down local internet access to thwart protests.
https://bahrainwatch.org/blog/2016/08/03/bahrain-internet-curfew/
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stored using website-based applications. The security of protocols to avoid “double spending” of
the instrument is also something that should be thoroughly investigated. On the positive side, an
e-cash system has the potential to be rapidly put to use nationwide during a crisis, when the only
alternative would be transporting and distributing physical cash over a large area. From this
perspective, an e-cash system could increase stability in times of crisis and boost the overall
resilience of the payments system. Naturally, the e-cash system should be designed to ensure wide
and easy access to liquidity across the whole of society, including vulnerable citizens such as elderly
or disabled people.

5 Additional considerations
There are two additional issues that a central bank should consider in studying the possibility of
issuing e-cash. One is the size of externalities associated with the use of physical currency in illicit
and criminal activities. The other involves the implications that e-cash would have for the privacy
of individuals.

5.1 Cash and crime
Some observers have asserted that cash and, in particular, large denomination notes are
empirically integral to crime and tax evasion, and so should be eliminated. Rogoff (2014) asserts
that the “major uses [of cash] seem to be buried in the world underground and illegal economy.”
Sands (2016) claims that “Illegal money flows pose a massive challenge to all societies, rich and
poor.” Summers (2016) calls for “a global agreement to stop issuing notes worth more than say
$50 or $100.”
This newfound interest in the connection between cash and crime is noteworthy and puzzling at
the same time. First, it seems to imply causality, that cash ultimately causes crime, when, in fact,
we should be talking about correlation. Even so, it is hard to quantify how massive the “challenge
to all societies” stemming from the correlation between crime and cash is relative to, say, crime
and fraudulent accounting practices (e.g., Enron or Parmalat frauds) or crime and commercial bank
money (e.g. lending by Italy’s BNL branch in Atlanta during the 80s). It is true that increasing the
costs from using cash could decrease the amount of crime correlated with it. However, on the one
hand, this might as well lead to instrument substitution not problem resolution (e.g. consider the
questionable uses of Bitcoin) and, on the other hand, if cash exists to facilitate trade, then it is an
empirical question how the inefficiency induced by removing cash would stack against the
efficiency gain from reducing cash-related negative externalities (Camera (2001)).
Second, the view that removing large denomination notes is instrumental to fighting crime seems
naïve. Large denomination banknotes are usually the dominant component in the sovereign
currency supply. In the U.S., $100 bills represent about ¾ of the total currency supply. Prohibiting,
or stigmatizing, possession of those notes would simply shift demand to the remaining ¼ of
smaller-size banknote supply. This would surely increase the cost to criminals, 33 but would also
create shortages and increased cash-management costs for everyone else. Finally, there does not
seem to be much empirical evidence that removing large denomination notes is instrumental in
fighting crime: in the U.S., large denomination notes have been removed over time — this has also
happened in Sweden — but one could hardly make the case that this ultimately led to a general
decrease in criminal activity. Additional empirical research in this area would be beneficial.

33

One of the advantages of larger sizes is less onerous storage and transportation. One million dollars composed of $100
bills fits in a small backpack.
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5.2 Privacy
One of the unique traits of cash transactions is that they help preserve privacy, which is a basic
human right. 34 It has been argued that, since cash enhances privacy, then cash must be primarily
used to hide misconduct and so it should be eliminated. This argument suffers from a basic fallacy
(not all those who prize privacy commit crimes) and again implies causality (privacy ultimately
causes misconduct) that has not been established as far as I know. Furthermore, privacy is an
important element of many activities — such as research with patent application potential or
strategic business decisions — where economic agents have nothing to hide from enforcement
agencies or contractual counterparties (Solove (2011)). As a result, the privacy offered by currencybased transactions may be beneficial if information is likely to be misused by opportunistic
counterparties (Kahn et al. (2005)). In summary, the tradeoff between advantages and
disadvantages of a currency that cannot guarantee privacy is potentially difficult, and should be
carefully considered in setting up an e-cash system.

6 Conclusion
Technological innovation has opened the door to cash-like instruments that are electronic and no
longer require the costly layers of financial intermediaries we use nowadays to settle payments.
Instruments with features of this kind — variously called digital, crypto, and virtual currencies —
have so far been supplied by private issuers. But currency systems are public goods, and private
currencies are more likely to be associated with risks and inefficiencies, such as credibility,
instability and volatility, compared to sovereign currencies issued by countries with historically
efficient institutions. This suggests there could be societal benefits from public players — such as
a trusted central bank — playing a primary role in currency innovation.
A central bank with a track record of being independent is in a unique position to ensure continuity
and confidence in the payment system by providing a clear framework and price anchors for the
new currency instrument, something that is an issue in the volatile world of privately-issued
abstract currencies such as Bitcoin. To further increase trust, the framework should explicitly
discuss — through legally binding agreements — if e-cash is convertible into cash upon demand,
and if there are limits to the central bank’s ability to charge negative interest rates or charge fees
on e-cash accounts, as a way to limit the perceived downside risk of e-cash. A clear operating
framework is also behaviorally important to maximize use and adoption of an electronic alternative
to cash.
How should a new e-cash system be organized? I do not see many advantages in adopting a
strongly centralized structure, one in which the central bank issues the currency instrument and
also provides services or products that have been traditionally offered by commercial banks on
currency deposits. In fact, depending on how the system is set up, there may not be a clear
distinction between e-cash and deposits (Broadbent (2016)). It is reasonable to leverage the
comparative advantage of the financial sector in providing financial services and to develop
products that suit individuals and businesses’ needs. In this scenario, the central bank would take
the primary role of issuing the new currency instrument, designing the architecture of the system,
and setting the operating standards.
Many questions, theoretical and empirical, remain open. Future central bank research should be
devoted to (i) narrowing down a set of possible operating frameworks to set up an e-cash system,
(ii) assessing and quantifying the possible risks during the transition period, (iii) studying the
consequences for the structure of banks and the monetary transmission channels, and (iv)
identifying new tools and procedures to manage those risks.
One problem with providing answers to some of these questions is the lack of data. For example,
how would the payment system function without traditional physical currency? And would it be
34

Privacy is discussed in Article 12 of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/en/universaldeclaration-human-rights/index.html
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optimal to simply remove all physical cash or could there be unintended repercussions for the
stability of the monetary and financial system? Naturally, we have no field data that can shed
empirical light on these kinds of questions. A viable solution would be for central banks to adopt
the experimental methodology (Smith 1994) of collecting laboratory data to study a relevant
theoretical operating principle, or to establish empirical regularities. For instance, if a theory
suggests a given set of conditions under which phasing out physical cash is optimal, then laboratory
experiments may help us validate that intuition, and determine if there are theoretically
unforeseen aspects that should be taken into account.
The emergence of new currency-like instruments such as Bitcoin is a game-changer in our societies.
It opens the door to transferring and storing value in ways that are simpler, faster and truly global.
Many of the questions that revolve around this paradigm shift are still open, so the considerations
I have made in this document should not be taken to be conclusive findings. My intention is to
offer a perspective — at times speculative — which is based on existing theoretical and behavioral
research in economics, which I hope can be helpful to those approaching the topic of currency
innovation.
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